# 1NR

## DA

#### Not going for it. Concede that both candidates support nuclear power, meaning cannot be linked to just Obama so it’s NUQ. Also, concede that economy thumps, meaning that plan doesn’t affect the election.

## CP

#### Our CP meets the threshold for your epistemology claims – we agree with your claims that nuclear power siting is bad and should be rejected. We fix the epistemologically suspect decisions that drive siting of nuclear power by rejecting the ENTIRETY of nuclear power.

#### This is net beneficial since it not only rejects racist siting in the case of lower socioeconomic communities but also the export potential of nuclear power whereby it can be transferred to poorer countries to enforce this same oppression. We solve a bigger epistemological question because those people don’t want nuclear power either. The 1AC evidence concedes.

#### They say it doesn’t solve – our discursive challenge of nuclear power under the CP allows for spillover into other industries much like their 1AC. Their 1AC is just as targeted at a certain industry as the affirmative is. They link just as hard to their other energy argument since they just focus on nuclear power too – our broader indict of an energy source solves better.

#### Perm links to the nuclear power bad net benefits.

### Condo

#### ...

#### Neg flex – key to test the aff from multiple angles and give us strategic options – aff gets to speak first and last, no one advocates the squo on this topic

#### ...

#### Logical decisionmaking – no one would vote for something worse than the squo – makes their model terminally useless

#### ...

#### Skews inevitable – we could read more T or case arguments to waste time

#### ...

#### 2NR checks – narrows the debate to one world for in-depth discussion.

#### ...

#### CI -two advocacies – checks regression.

#### ...

## Apartheid

### Waste

#### Top level issue – their calculated claims are just as applicable towards the affirmative. They ignore the intersectionality and diverse claims of minorities by homogenizing them. This turns case because it perpetuates their subordination at the hands of the USFG that supposedly knows their needs.

#### They say not all waste storage is not bad - Discourse surrounding nuclear waste siting is racist – valued technical arguments over a culturally based perspective. Natives did not want nuclear waste.

Endres, Associate Professor of Communications at the University of Utah, ‘12

[Danielle, “Sacred Land or National Sacrifice Zone: The Role of Values in the Yucca Mountain Participation Process”, Process, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 6:3, 328-345, RSR]

Despite this progress, flaws remain in many currently used processes of participation (Depoe & Delicath, 2004). Although decision makers have adopted more dialogic participatory models of participation in some settings (e.g., Dietz & Stern, 2008), the NWPA participation process followed for Yucca Mountain remains an essentially technocratic Decide-Announce-Defend (DAD) model in which decisions are made by scientific and policy experts and then presented to the public for approval. Most DAD participation processes value scientific and technical arguments over social-, cultural-, and value-based arguments (e.g., Depoe & Delicath, 2004; Farrell & Goodnight, 1981; Fiorino, 1990; Katz & Miller, 1996; Toker, 2002; Waddell, 1990, 1996). Expanding upon these critiques of DAD models, I specifically examine the role for values in these models. Although scientific, cultural, and social dimensions of decision making are all influenced by values, technocratic decision makers often assume that scientific and technical arguments are value free, thus relegating values to the realm of the social and cultural dimensions that are already marginalized. Therefore, technocratic decision making automatically assumes one set of implicit values while excluding other competing values under the false assumption that science is value free. These flaws in DAD participation processes also apply in the more specific realm of decision making over nuclear technologies. The public sphere surrounding nuclear technologies is ‘‘constricted and degraded by technocratic domination’’ (Taylor, Kinsella, Depoe, & Metzler, 2007, p. 381). Stakeholder participation in nuclear issues is particularly problematic because of secrecy, discursive containment, and the perception that the highly technical nature of nuclear technologies is best handled by experts (e.g., Kinsella, 2001, 2005; Taylor, 1998; Taylor et al., 2007). Scientific and technical knowledge dictate the process with little attention paid to other relevant forms of expertise. In the case of Yucca Mountain, participation in the Yucca Mountain siting decision occurred in the form of comment periods held during both the EIS process (1996 2004) and site authorization decision (2001 2002). While the EIS comment period valued scientific and technical arguments over social and cultural arguments (Ratliff, 1997), the site authorization comment period explicitly called for only scientific and technical arguments (Endres, 2009a). The DOE explicitly framed the site authorization comment period as: (1) an opportunity for the DOE to educate ‘the public’ and (2) for ‘the public’ to comment on the scientific and technical arguments produced by Yucca Mountain Project scientists (DOE, 2002b, 2002c). The participation process created neither a role for non-technical arguments nor a role for the values underlying both technical and non-technical arguments. Yet, opponents and proponents still made value-based claims, which formed a significant stasis point in the controversy.

#### Their argument ignores the fact that storing in native lands is perpetuating the very claim that they need nuclear waste. The economic ruin based upon economic exploitation of native Americans has forced them to accept waste. We must end this self-perpetuating cycle.

#### The USFG uses tribal sovereignty against Natives, exploiting their control over the land to turn them into nuclear sacrifice zones

Kuletz, Prof. of American Studies @ U of Canterbury, 98

[Valerie, The Tainted Desert: Environmental Ruin in the American West, pg. 95-96, RSR]

When people say that nuclearism is the “price we pay for freedom”, they usually omit the fact that this price is paid by those with disproportionately less power. Though poor communities often pay the highest price, more privileged Americans are not exempt from some kind of “payment”. Indeed, given that we are contemplating materials that transgress the social demarcations of borders and boundaries, it sometimes seems superfluous to talk about maps at all. Admittedly, there is irony in mapping a nuclear sacrifice zone when nuclear pollution tends to make boundaries obsolete. Even so, as we have seen with the uranium mining district, as well as the nuclear testing ranges, identifiable zones of concentration of nuclear activity exist that are substantively different from other regions. Likewise, some regions and people are actively targeted for nuclear waste disposal. As Grace Thorpe, tribal judge and health commission for Sauk and Fox Nation of Oklahoma, put it: The U.S. government targeted Native Americans [for nuclear waste disposal] for several reasons: their lands are some of the most isolated in North America, they are some of the most impoverished and, consequently, most politically vulnerable and, perhaps most important, tribal sovereignty can be used to bypass state environmental laws. How ironic that, after centuries attempting to destroy it, the U.S. government is suddenly interested in promoting Native American sovereignty – just to dump its lethal garbage…[and] and serve as hosts for the nation’s nuclear garbage dump.” The only two potential national, deep-geologic, high-level, and military waste sites in the United States are on or near traditional Indian lands; all recent proposals for temporary nuclear waste storage sites are for Indian reservations; and the nation’s new premiere “low-level” nuclear dump site also borders native communities on traditional native lands. The U.S. government has offered (through the office of the U.S. Nuclear Negotiator) often destitute Native communities substantial sums of money to consider waste-storage possibilities. As noted by Indian environmental activist Winona LaDuke: Indian reservations, which constitute [only] four percent of US lands, hold vast supplies of uranium, coal and timber. These vast, isolated lands are also attractive to industries searching for disposal sites for nuclear waste. In the past four years, more than 100 separate proposals have been made by government and industry to dump waste on Indian lands. To date, Indians have received 16 of the 18 “nuclear waste research grants” issued by the US Department of Energy…[I]n 1987, CERT (Council of Energy Resource Tribes) received $2.5 million from federal nuclear waste contracts – more than half the organization’s total income. In 1992, CERT received $1.2 million in federal grants for nuclear waste programs – 80% of the group’s federal grants.

#### This does not take out any of the nuclear genocide argument. Even if they want waste, nuclear waste siting is a form of radioactive colonialism. Native Americans have to contend with the worst waste, which saps them of an infrastructure to address dire problems. That’s Bullard and Johnson. That leads to nuclear ethnocide. That’s Enders.

#### This genocidal mentality against Natives is a priori because it is ontological

Wilderson 10 [FB, Red, White, & Black]

Again, if Accumulation and Fungibility are the modalities through which embodied Blackness is positioned as incapacity, then Genocide is that modality through which embodied Redness is positioned as incapacity. Ontological incapacity, I have inferred and here state forthright, is the constituent element of ethics. Put another way, one cannot embody capacity and be, simultaneously, ethical. Where there are Slaves it is unethical to be free. The Settler/Master’s capacity, I have argued, is a function of exploitation and alienation; and the Slave’s incapacity is elaborated by accumulation and fungibility. But the “Savage” is positioned, structurally, by subjective capacity and objective incapacity, by sovereignty and genocide, respectively. It is the Indian’s liminal status in political economy, the manner in which her/his positionality shuttles between the incapacity of a genocided object and the capacity of a sovereign subject, coupled with the fact that Redness does not overdetermine the “thanatology” (Judy 89, 94) of libidinal economy—this liminal capacity within political economy and complete freedom from incapacity within libidinal economy—which raises serious doubts about the status of “Savage” ethicality vis-à-vis the triangulated structure (Red, White, and Black) of antagonisms. Clearly, the coherence of Whiteness as a structural position in modernity depends on the capacity to be free from genocide, not, perhaps, as an historical experience, but at least as a positioning modality. This embodied capacity (genocidal immunity) of Whiteness jettisons the White/Red relation from that of a conflict and marks it as an antagonism: it stains it with irreconcilability. Here, the Indian comes into being, and is positioned, by an a priori violence of genocide. Whiteness can also experience this kind of violence but only a fortiori: genocide may be one of a thousand contingent experiences of Whiteness but it is not a constituent element, it does not make Whites White (or Humans Human). Whiteness can grasp its own capacity, be present to itself, coherent, by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Red genocide, as well as by its unavailability to the a priori violence of Black accumulation and fungibility. If it experiences accumulation and fungibility, or genocide, those experiences must be named, qualified, i.e. “White slavery,” or the Armenian massacre, the Jewish Holocaust, Bosnian interment, so that such contingent experience is not confused with ontological necessity. In such a position one can always say, “I’m not a ‘Savage’” or “I’m being treated like a nigger.” One can reassert one’s Humanity by refusing the ruse of analogy. Regardless of Whites’ historical, and brief, encounters with the modalities of the “Savage” and of the Slave, these modalities do not break in on the position of Whiteness with such a force as to replace exploitation and alienation as the Settler/Master’s constituent elements. We might think of exploitation and alienation as modalities of suffering which inoculate Whiteness from death. If this is indeed the case, then perhaps Whiteness has no constituent elements other than the immanent status of immunity. Still, this immunity is no small matter, for it is the sin qua non of Human capacity.

### Nuclear Power Bad Warming

#### They say nuclear power is key to solve warming – our evidence is the only comparative on this issue. Nuclear power mining leads to releasing of CFCs which are comparatively worse for warming. Independently, this depletes the ozone causing extinction. That’s Williams.

#### They can’t reduce emissions fast enough - NP is too little too late for climate change, renewable energy like solar and wind will be efficient and cost-competitive by the time the first reactor could be built.

Mariotte 7 (Michael, executive director, Nuclear Info and Resource Service, Nov 6 http://www.cfr.org/publication/14718/nuclear\_power\_in\_response\_to\_climate\_change.html)

Environmental advocates considering “reconsidering” nuclear power in light of climate change are too late. The accelerating pace of the climate crisis and the dawning realization that we no longer have the luxury of a few decades to address the crisis already have made nuclear power an irrelevant technology in terms of climate. Even if the nuclear industry had solved the safety, radioactive waste, proliferation, cost, and other issues that ended its first generation—and it hasn’t solved any of those problems—it wouldn’t matter. What nuclear power can offer for climate is simply too little, too late. The major studies that have looked at the issue—[MIT](http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/), the National Commission on [Energy Policy](http://www.energycommission.org/site/page.php?index), etc.—generally agree that for nuclear to make a meaningful contribution to carbon emissions reduction would require reactor construction on a massive scale: 1,200 to 2,000 new reactors worldwide, 200 to 400 in the United States alone. And that would have to be done over the next f40 to 50 years. Pity poor Japan Steel Works, the world’s major facility for forging reactor pressure vessels (there is one other, small-capacity facility in Russia): working overtime it can produce twleve pressure vessels per year. Do the math: That’s less than half of what is needed. Even if someone put in the billions of dollars and years necessary to build a new forging facility, it’s still not enough, not fast enough. There are 104 operable reactors in the United States today. In November 2017, no matter how much taxpayer money is thrown at the nuclear industry, there will be 104—or fewer. Even with streamlined licensing procedures and certified reactor designs, it will take ten, twelve years or more to license, build and bring a single new reactor online. And since most of the reactor designs being considered are first or second of a kind, count on them taking even longer. Our energy future ultimately will be carbon-free and nuclear-free, based primarily on solar and wind power, energy efficiency, and distributed generation. What is perhaps less obvious is that the future is now. In the years we’d be waiting for that first new reactor to come online, we can install ten times or more solar and wind capacity, and save twenty times or more that much power through increased efficiency while building the mass production that reduces costs, especially for photovoltaics. By the time that first reactor could come online, solar could already be cost-competitive, while wind and efficiency already are cheaper than nuclear. We no longer have ten years to begin reducing carbon emissions. Waiting around for a few new reactors won’t help our climate, but it would waste the funds needed to implement our real energy future.

#### Electricity production only accounts for 9% of Greenhouse Gas emissions and nuclear energy would divert resources from other projects that address climate change.

Nuclear Monitor, 5.

(“Nuclear Power: No solution to climate Change” A new report from NIRS/WISE

International. <http://www.nirs.org/mononline/nukesclimatechangereport.pdf>, feb)

Switching the entire world's electricity production to nuclear would still not solve the problem. Moreover, by diverting the world’s resources from sustainable energy production to nuclear power, it would only exacerbate the problem by diverting scare resources away from those technologies which offer real hope for addressing climate change.This is partly because the production of electricity is only one of many human activities that release greenhouse gases. Others include transport and heating, agriculture, the production of cement and deforestation. The CO2 released worldwide through electricity production accounts for only 9% of total annual human greenhouse gas emissions.

#### And, the heat outweighs any carbon reduction. This literally warms the earth before the emissions get up there that kills everyone. That’s Sify.

### Nuclear Power Bad Yucca

#### Yucca will be sited in the SQUO and is only bad when it stores nuclear waste. Banning nuclear power solves the waste question preventing the explosion of Yucca Mountain. That’s the Braod evidence.

## Epistemology

#### Governments have to act from a utilitarian calculus.

Harries, 94 – Editor @ The National Interest

[Owen, Power and Civilization, The National Interest, Spring, lexis]

#### Prioritizing epistemology reifies, rewards extremism and causes self-serving scholarship – turns the aff.

Lake, Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California – San Diego, ‘11

[David, “Why ‘‘isms’’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress”, International Studies Quarterly, 2011, 55, 465-480, RSR]

#### Their epistemology is not superior simply because they assert it to be true. Embracing their position leads to complete moral relativism.

Hammersley, Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning, ‘93

[Martyn, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” British Journal of Sociology, 44.3, 432-434]

#### We have a defense of our epistemology – it’s of institutional concern - governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

### Consequences XT

#### Morally obligated towards consequences.

Weiss, Prof Poli Sci – CUNY Grad Center, ‘99

(Thomas G, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 13.1)

Scholars and practitioners frequently employ the term “dilemma” to describe painful decision making but “quandary” would be more apt.27A dilemma involves two or more alternative courses of action with unintended but unavoidable and equally undesirable consequences. If consequences are equally unpalatable, then remaining inactive on the sidelines is an option rather than entering the serum on the field. A quandary, on the other hand, entails tough choices among unattractive options with better or worse possible outcomes. While humanitarians are perplexed, they are not and should not be immobilized. The solution is not indifference or withdrawal but rather appropriate engagement. The key lies in making a good faith effort to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of different alloys of politics and humanitarianism, and then to choose what often amounts to the lesser of evils. Thoughtful humanitarianism is more appropriate than rigid ideological responses, for four reasons: goals of humanitarian action often conflict, good intentions can have catastrophic consequences; there are alternative ways to achieve ends; and even if none of the choices is ideal, victims still require decisions about outside help. What Myron Wiener has called “instrumental humanitarianism” would resemble just war doctrine because contextual analyses and not formulas are required. Rather than resorting to knee-jerk reactions to help, it is necessary to weigh options and make decisions about choices that are far from optimal. Many humanitarian decisions in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda—and especially those involving economic or military sanctions— required selecting least-bad options. Thomas Nagle advises that “given the limitations on human action, it is naive to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem. “29 Action-oriented institutions and staff are required in order to contextualized their work rather than apply preconceived notions of what is right or wrong. Nonetheless, classicists continue to insist on Pictet’s “indivisible whole” because humanitarian principles “are interlocking, overlapping and mutually supportive. . . . It is hard to accept the logic of one without also accepting the others. “30 The process of making decisions in war zones could be compared to that pursued by “clinical ethical review teams” whose members are on call to make painful decisions about life-and-death matters in hospitals.sl The sanctity of life is complicated by new technologies, but urgent decisions cannot be finessed. It is impermissible to long for another era or to pretend that the bases for decisions are unchanged. However emotionally wrenching, finding solutions is an operational imperative that is challenging but intellectually doable. Humanitarians who cannot stand the heat generated by situational ethics should stay out of the post-Cold War humanitarian kitchen. Principles in an Unprincipled World Why are humanitarians in such a state of moral and operational disrepair? In many ways Western liberal values over the last few centuries have been moving toward interpreting moral obligations as going beyond a family and intimate networks, beyond a tribe, and beyond a nation. The impalpable moral ideal is concern about the fate of other people, no matter how far away.szThe evaporation of distance with advances in technology and media coverage, along with a willingness to intervene in a variety of post–Cold War crises, however, has produced situations in which humanitarians are damned if they do and if they don’t. Engagement by outsiders does not necessarily make things better, and it may even create a “moral hazard by altering the payoffs to combatants in such a way as to encourage more intensive fighting.“33 This new terrain requires analysts and practitioners to admit ignorance and question orthodoxies. There is no comfortable theoretical framework or world vision to function as a compass to steer between integration and fragmentation, globalization and insularity. Michael Ignatieff observes, “The world is not becoming more chaotic or violent, although our failure to understand and act makes it seem so. “34Gwyn Prins has pointed to the “scary humility of admitting one’s ignorance” because “the new vogue for ‘complex emergencies’ is too often a means of concealing from oneself that one does not know what is going on. “3sTo make matters more frustrating, never before has there been such a bombardment of data and instant analysis; the challenge of distilling such jumbled and seemingly contradictory information adds to the frustration of trying to do something appropriate fast. International discourse is not condemned to follow North American fashions and adapt sound bites and slogans. It is essential to struggle with and even embrace the ambiguities that permeate international responses to wars, but without the illusion of a one-size-fits-all solution. The trick is to grapple with complexities, to tease out the general without ignoring the particular, and still to be inspired enough to engage actively in trying to make a difference. Because more and more staff of aid agencies, their governing boards, and their financial backers have come to value reflection, an earlier policy prescription by Larry Minear and me no longer appears bizarre: “Don’t just do something, stand there! “3sThis advice represented our conviction about the payoffs from thoughtful analyses and our growing distaste for the stereotypical, yet often accurate, image of a bevy of humanitarian actors flitting from one emergency to the next.

#### Their framing of the plan in exclusively ethical terms undercuts any chance for political transformation – only debate over the best mechanism for change and the possible negative consequences of pursuing ethical ideals can translate into a politically effective strategy. This is particularly true of college students, whose failure to debate nitty-gritty policy details dooms their moralism.

Issac 2 (Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Spring 2002, Dissent, Vol. 49, No. 2)

Politics is about ends and means--about the values that we pursue and the methods by which we pursue them. In a perfect world, there would be a perfect congruence between ends and means: our ends would always be achievable through means that were fully consistent with them; the tension between ends and means would not exist. But then there would be no need to pursue just ends, for these would already be realized. Such a world of absolute justice lies beyond politics. The left has historically been burdened by the image of such a world. Marx's vision of the "riddle of history solved" and Engels's vision of the "withering away of the state" were two canonical expressions of the belief in an end-state in which perfect justice could be achieved once and for all. But the left has also developed a concurrent tradition of serious strategic thinking about politics. Centered around but not reducible to classical Marxism, this tradition has focused on such questions as the relations of class, party, and state; the consequences of parliamentary versus revolutionary strategies of social change; the problem of hegemony and the limits of mass politics; the role of violence in class struggle; and the relationship between class struggle and war. These questions preoccupied Karl Kautsky, V.I. Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukacs, and Antonio Gramsci--and also John Dewey, Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, George Orwell, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Albert Camus. The history of left political thought in the twentieth century is a history of serious arguments about ends and means in politics, arguments about how to pursue the difficult work of achieving social justice in an unjust world. Many of these arguments were foolish, many of their conclusions were specious, and many of the actions followed from them were barbaric. The problem of ends and means in politics was often handled poorly, but it was nonetheless taken seriously, even if so many on the left failed to think clearly about the proper relationship between their perfectionist visions and their often Machiavellian strategies. What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left--by which I mean "progressive" faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates--has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing--about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq--continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it--about globalization and sweatshops--is new and in some ways promising (see my "Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement," Dissent, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic--petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. BUT WHAT IS absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of "anti-imperialism" speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states--including most workers and the poor--value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jurgen Habermas has called "constitutional patriotism": a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all-too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left's alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that "the United States Government is the world's greatest terror organization," and suggest that "homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government" engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any "disloyalty." Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The "peace" demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks--in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role--were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers' lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn't really happened. Whatever one thinks about America's deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of "solidarity" with certain oppressed groups--Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans--and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. A CASE IN POINT is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: "Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law." This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9-11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: "vengeance offers no relief... retaliation can never guarantee healing... and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice." On this view military action of any kind is figured as "aggression" or "vengeance"; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, "healing" is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response--or at least any U.S. military response--is simply defined as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of any military response. It is virtually impossible either to "apprehend" and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the "criminals" in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to "arrest" them. And, finally, while "healing" is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a political goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for "social justice abroad." It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility--these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter--the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America's use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare--which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation--make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left's reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of "materialism" and evocations of "struggle," especially on the part of those many who are not pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable "anti-militarism" of today's campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post-cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post-September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power.